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Religious Incitement and Hate Speech

1. Why this study?

This study aims at indicating whether there was any incitement to religious hatred in the Lebanese media signatories to the "Journalists' Pact for Strengthening Civil Peace in Lebanon", which was officially launched on June 25, 2013. The study also works to monitor manifestations of this incitement, if any, and to indicate the trends of these media and their positions, mainly, of the subject of the obligation to respect all religions and abstaining from stirring sectarian strife, and of the subject of religious intolerance and seeking or responding to incitement, in accordance with Article II of the Pact. To what extent was the media's commitment to the principles they approved of clear?

The religious subject is one of high level of importance given its direct relevance to Lebanon's general condition and being a very sensitive subject at the political, social, cultural, moral and geographical levels, so much so that it almost deeply affects all forms of political and social practices. It is also highly susceptible to falling into the trap of violence and hatred if abused; and it has direct repercussions on the daily lives of Lebanese citizens.

Thus, an up close reading of the mass media would provide a picture of the performance and aid in the proposition of solutions for preventing negative repercussions.

It is worth noting here that this study is the second of five studies launched by Maharat Foundation in cooperation with the United Nations 2015 "Peace Building in Lebanon Project." The first study addressed "Monitoring Racism in the Lebanese Media" and the subsequent studies will address the following subjects:

- "Violence depicted in Media" given its repercussions on all levels, including social, political and educational levels;
- "Positive Initiatives" that would establish a developed and recuperative society;
- "The Talk shows," and the values and concepts they market.

These are topics that reflect all the Pact's provisions and address the main axes-baselines signed by the media in an attempt to work on strengthening civil peace and its consecration.

2. The Problematic/Research question

There is a lot to be said about incitement, in all its forms, and in particular incitement to religious hatred, which is directly linked to the sectarian conflict that currently exists in the regions; in light of the ubiquitous presence of traditional media and the digital revolution that has made social networking the first social interface, and in light of the escalation of conflicts and the use of these traditional and rapidly evolving modern media in practicing convictions, using them as barricades and strafes and expressing them.

The increasing importance of media and means of communication, then, is entrenched for being, on the one hand, the dynamic place for holding the diverse social and political dialogue, and on the other hand, the place where intellectual and cultural movements and social transformations of all kinds intersect, with all the diverse views they carry, of which are the dovish speech that is based on values of citizenship and human rights, and the violent provocative speech that poses a threat to civil peace and coexistence among the components of the society.

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Based on the centrality of the role of these media, the methodology seeks to discern the extent of the Lebanese media liability when it comes to communicating and fuelling incitement to religious hatred and the Lebanese media addresses the religious speech, as well as to find out consequently if the Lebanese media contributes to producing hate speech on a religious basis in a country that is highly sectarian.

The specificity of the subject makes the study sensitive because it can simply diverge into side subjects that are all essential, such as: How is religion perceived? How does religion regard its representations? How can the religious speech bear its opposite and defend it? How do we define extremism? What does religion mean in the Middle East region and what does religion mean in a multi-religious country called "the message"? What does strengthening civil peace in the time of extremism, exclusion and phasing out on a religious basis mean, along with what is linked to this act in terms of narratives and manifestations in media?

3. Methodology

In order to investigate the existence or the lack of existence of the inciting religious speech in the Lebanese media that signed the Pact from a political point of view relating to civil peace, its measurement and the monitoring of its manifestations, the study relies on a scientific methodology by using the quantitative and qualitative measurement principles, then analyzing the content of the material monitored from the results derived from the numbers and get back to the context. This is followed by a comparison of the variables between one method and the other and one topic and the other. The approach is descriptive, analogical and analytical.

Since incitement speech is tactical, aims at hegemony and begs media to realize its achievements, and since media is a platform for every control, the following questions had to be addressed:

- How did the media deal with the religious topic in a sectarian country, while the majority of its media is divided according to sect and politics?
- Is there an incitement speech with a religious background?
- What is the role of media in incitement to religious hatred, i.e. in reproducing the incitement in speech (by this we mean the resulting words and images)?
- Is incitement to religious hatred at the heart of the speech of the author or the conflicting parties or it is due to the multitude of media productions (we can go towards the hypothesis of participation in the production of the incitement speech)?
- Does the media division in Lebanon on a political and religious basis contribute in communicating or fuelling or making the incitement speech? Or do media defend the right and freedom of expression?

The emphasis on the survey – the subject matter of the study – comes as a model for the process of reading and treating the representations of a specific reality, not only based on what the said media speech presented per se, but also on the belief of the link between the media narrative and its environment as a main factor in delimiting the features of this reality. The connection between what is happening and how to express it, as well as between the event and its symbolism is close, which makes the word and image main incitement tools.

The link of the events to a religious background and their connection as a whole to a remote pivotal event (when we talk about the historical Sunni – Shiite conflict) and the talks of (political conflict) accelerate evoking the feelings through religious and sectarian fuelling, which refers us to the hate speech and the investigation of its existence and its practice modes. Since the incitement act includes the desire to act, one must research the strategies of the act as well as the terms of its production and success, and how the incitement can "hinder any move forward."

Any conflict between two parties guarantees the reactivation of the negative depictions of the opponent. The narratives in this occasion form a field

4. Survey

The sample of the study coincided with the start of the events in Yemen and the flaring of the verbal conflict in Lebanon and the region.

The study was based on a sample of news and reports that were published in Lebanese newspapers and news websites, and were broadcast in the news bulletins of the Lebanese terrestrial stations and Lebanese radio stations all through April 2015.

The study selected the most important Lebanese media among the ones that have signed the Pact, including daily newspapers, TV stations, radio stations and websites. It also selected a research subject matter that meets the research and analysis requirements.

The monitoring process included the following media throughout the month of April 2015:

- **Daily newspapers:** An-Nahar, As-Safir, Al-Akh-

bar, Al-Mustaqbal, Al-Sharq, Al Liwaa, Al Joumhouria, Ad-Diyar, L'Orient-Le Jour, The Daily Star.

The monitoring and analysis process aims at:

- Measuring the volume, distribution and contents of the material studied,
- Identifying the existence of an accusatory speech on a religious and sectarian basis, measuring it, defining the targeted party and the acting party and analysing its content,
- Studying the tone used,
- Analysing the media speech containing the incitement in case it was found.

bar, Al-Mustaqbal, Al-Sharq, Al Liwaa, Al Joumhouria, Ad-Diyar, L'Orient-Le Jour, The Daily Star.

- **TV stations:** MTV, LBCI, OTV, FUTURE TV, New TV, ALMANAR, TL.
- **Radio stations:** Radio Liban Libre, Al-Nour station, Radio Liban, Radio Orient, Sawt El Chaab (Voice of the People), Sawt El Mada, Voice of Lebanon – Achrafieh (100.5), Voice of Lebanon (93.3).
- **News websites:** National News Agency, Lebanon Files, NOW, Elnashra, Almodon.

In addition, the ledes of the news bulletins of these stations were analysed on the following dates: 3, 7, 8, 9, 16, 17, 21 and 23 April 2015. The methodology dedicated a full study of the news bulletins of FUTURE TV and ALMANAR in the said dates, which addressed the main and marginal news and the reports related to the topics containing religious

connotations in terms of the author, the subject, the place, the occasion, etc. The two main events that were reflected in the political and media discourse during this time period are the events in Yemen which was called “decisive storm” and “renewal of hope”, in addition to the American-Iranian nuclear deal.

In the Lebanese internal affairs, the following topics were raised in conjunction with the regional events:

- The continuation of the dialogue between Future movement and Hezbollah,
- The dialogue between the Free Patriotic movement and the Lebanese Forces,
- The 40th anniversary of the Lebanese civil war,
- The presidential vacuum,
- The Easter holidays for the Christian sects coincided also during this period.

Section 1: Theoretical Approach

1. Media and Incitement to Religious Hatred

The study of the relation between incitement to religious hatred and the (media) speech requires examining a set of relations, starting with the relation of the language with power, ideology and culture, the “sacred” with the ordinary, the discourse with reality, as well as researching a group of theoretical levels and knowledge problems such as the authority of language and the centrality of the station, i.e. the media. The study also requires certain basic definitions.

The incitement speech is the one aiming at intimidation, incitement to violence and prejudice against a person or a group of persons based on various characteristics: race, religion, gender, etc. In this sense, it is synonymous to the hate speech which contradicts the principles of civil peace and causes the disintegration of the society and the emergence of all sorts of conflicts.

The specificity of the religious discourse and the incitement to religious hatred is that they are linked through this common space between the author and the receiver who, through the religious discourse, will approve, be convinced, or fuel his belief and through the incitement speech will hate or increase his hate.

There are many talks about incitement in all its forms, particularly the incitement to religious hatred, which is directly connected to the sectarian conflict existing currently in the region, and that, in light of the strong deployment of the traditional media and the digital revolution which made the first social façade out of social media, and in light of the aggravation of the conflicts and the use of these traditional and modern means, which are developing fast, in practicing beliefs, hiding behind them, throwing them at one another and expressing them.

Thus, the increasing importance of media and communication is consolidated for being the vital place to establish the diversified social and political dialogue on one hand, and on the other hand the place where the intellectual and cultural currents of all kinds coincide, along with what it entails in terms

2. Defining the Concepts

a. Concerning the definition of incitement

To research the nature of incitement, we start from the lexical definitions. All the dictionaries carry, implicitly, in their definition a subject who makes another subject perform a specific thing after stirring the latter's emotions. All dictionaries evoke the intensity in stirring feelings and the speed of action.¹ The action is often negative in its suggestions and results. The common factor of incitement to violence, racism and religious hatred is hate.

When the incitement encompasses the religious dimension, it is subject to important circumstances – factors that are related to the country:

¹ Incitation from the Latin word *incitatio*: “Fast action”, “the act of moving, exciting, and the motive”. Almaany dictionary defines Incitement, in Arabic, as “To incite someone to act, to urge, to move to action, entice, impel, inspire, motivate, prompt, agitate, stimulate...”

In Arabic:

حَرَضَهُ عَلَى الأَمْرِ : حَضَّهُ، شَدَّدَ الرِّغْبَةَ فِيهِ
أَثَارَ : أَحَثَّ ؛ إِسْتَنْهَضَ ؛ أَعْرَى ؛ أَقَامَ ؛ أَيْقَظَ ؛ بَعَثَ عَلَى ؛ جَعَلَ ؛ حَثَّ ؛ حَثَّ (عَلَى)
(؛ حَثَّ عَلَى ؛ حَرَّشَ ؛ حَرَّضَ ؛ حَرَّضَ عَلَى ؛ حَرَّكَ ؛ حَضَّ ؛ حَفَزَ ؛ حَفَزَ عَلَى ؛ حَمَلَ
عَلَى ؛ دَفَعَ إِلَى ؛ هَوَّشَ ؛ هَيَّجَ

The Larousse French dictionary defines incitement:

“Inciter: pousser vivement quelqu'un à quelque chose”.

of various opinions, including the dovish speech based on the values of citizenship and human rights, including the incitement to violence speech, which constitutes a danger to the civil peace and the coexistence between the society components.

- Measuring whether the incitement to religious hatred is causing consequences that are breaching security and reach the level of armed clashes.
- Whether this affects civil peace or hinders its realization.
- The specificity of the country i.e. if there were in modern or relatively ancient history confrontations with a religious or sectarian aspect and therefore the incitement speech can trigger it again, etc.
- And consequently in the hatred reservoir, which is moved by the religious factor in a fast and instinctive way.
- The composition of the society and its approach to the absolute.

b. Concerning the definition of the hate speech

The definition of the incitement speech and the hate speech is neither clear nor accurate, even if we are to include certain definitions herein, due to the presence of several verbal and symbolic practices in both speeches that intersect.

Among the practices that are related to the hate speech and incitement: fanaticism and prejudice. Fanaticism is defined as “an attitude or feeling or belief through which an individual expresses dis-

dain towards other individuals or groups based on features such as race, color, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, political or religious doctrine.”²

Maybe one of the most important people to have defined prejudice is the famous American psychologist Gordon Allport who addressed the topic in his book published in 1954, *The Nature of Prejudice*, by linking the cognitive processes to the social dimensions for the emergence of discrimination based on prejudice. In his opinion, prejudice is “an attitude of rejection or hostility towards a person belonging to a group, simply because of his belonging to that group, and hence it is assumed that he has the negative traits generally attributed to this same group.

The discrimination based on prejudice arises from cognitive processes and in particular from the inclination each individual has to categorize, organize, simplify and schematize the complexity of social reality. In turn, since placing people in categories is per se a reductive process, and associated to an affective-assessing element, categorizing can in turn produce stereotypes and arbitrary generalizations.”³ The social practices show that intolerance and prejudice are at the root of the discrimination acts and they can easily form a motive for practices with obvious connotations such as racism for instance.

² The definition also includes a negative connotation: “he was accused of inciting people to riot: he pushed them to cause riot”.

³ Annamaria Riviera, *Prejudice*, Reset Doc, 20 November 2006 :

<http://www.resetdoc.org/story/00000000221>
Cf. the book: Gordon Allport, *The Nature of Prejudice*. Cambridge, Perseus Publishing, New York, 1988.

The hate speech concept is used to describe a large group of speeches or very insulting expressions, ranging from hatred and incitement to racial, ethnic, religious and sexual discrimination, to abuse and defamation, passing by the aggravating forms of bias. Therefore, one can easily talk about hatred speeches, for they are multifaceted, and the use of the singular to denote them, i.e. hatred speech, is due to their common feature, namely the incitement to hatred or the incitement to hatred and violence. ⁴

Even though media are capable of absorbing resentment, disseminating and activating the dialogue mechanisms, accepting the other and staying away from exclusion, the incitement speech using the language of insults actually offends the role of media. Therefore, it is essential to emphasize the power and importance of media. The words and pictures used by reporters and journalists for covering the event play an essential role in the approach of the receiver to the subject. Charged words stir up instincts and emotions, and here we start talking about a type of judgments, not about the narration of events. Likewise, the pictures of victims do not only mean that there is a victim about whom media care, but rather that the scene bears all the violent psychological charging that stirs up all instincts and therefore leads to incitement to violence, to hostility or to hate. When the media use all the verbal, auditory and visual means to confront the other and to depict them in the worst of images and attack them, the conflict and the act charging get more intense and the gap between the parties gets wider.

⁴ Cf. Denizeau Charlotte, « L'Europe face au(x) discours de haine », *Revue générale du droit (revue de droit en ligne)* : (www.revuegeneraledudroit.eu), *Etudes et réflexions* 2015, numéro 11.

c. Concerning the religious speech

The speech – subject of research is not only religious, even if it contains religious connotations. It is a political speech; a social practice that affects the social conception in theories, beliefs and ideologies, in what people think is real. The speech uses strategies to express the desire and need to impress others within power relations aiming at convincing (and be convinced). As Patrick Charaudeau says, “every speech is a crossroad between the political action field (The space of the symbolic exchanges, the field organized according to the influence and power relations therein, as the sociologist Bourdieu says) and the field of political wording (the space of the words used in the references and the perceptions between the political actors).” ⁵

The political speech depends, in the act of convincing, on logic, on the position of the speaker as well as on emotion, i.e. the argumentation through the emotional impact and stirring up the (religious) instinct.

The speech in the survey subject of the study is therefore political, even if it was overshadowed by the religious aspect in analysing the event and its symbolism and in approaching the political Lebanese reality in a confessional system in an area that is far away from any secularization.

⁵ Patrick Charaudeau: *Le discours politique*, 2005 :

<http://www.albayan.ae/paths/books/1.990425-26-12-2005-1134560834499>
Cf. Charaudeau Patrick, *Le discours politique*, Vuibert, Paris, 2005.

In the survey that lies before us, those who are outside the religious discourse will not fit into the narrative space. The reference is made for religion and the sacred; the absolute that cannot be criticized, as well as its manifestations and symbols. The survey has allowed us to read the importance of the religious dimension in the Lebanese politics and to measure how a strict argumentation is stationed behind extremism.

The power of the present speech is that it belongs to deixis, which is understood as “indicating the place and identity of persons, things, operations, events and activities... according to the place – time context which was established and preserved by the pronunciation act”⁶ (and here lies the Sunni – Shiite conflict). The speech then crates an argumentative environment with a religious character and links it to Lebanese values.

The speech breaks the succession/cascade and puts a separation between before and after. Before is not the same as after. We read that “what is after the Yemen war is not the same as before”; coming back to this date makes it a reference, and putting it in a textual and argumentative context legalizes it and lays the foundation for deixis.

In the Lebanese post-war media discourse, there are several deixis instances: August 7, May 8, July war, liberation, etc. But regarding the survey, there is the return to the Sunni – Shiite conflict and the region and many deixis instances too, including the Islamic republic after the success of the Islamic revolution and the rise of Khomeini to power in Iran in 1978-1979.

⁶ Patrick Charaudeau, Dominique Maingueneau, *Lexicon Discourse Analysis*, translated by Abdul Kadir al-Mahiri, Sabour Hamadi, Sinatra Publisher, 2008.

Section 2: Quantitative Analysis of the Coverage in the Lebanese Media

This section presents the quantitative analysis of the media that the study addressed throughout the month of April of the year 2015, and it presents charts that facilitate viewing the results by distributing the headlines according to the current issues,

the topics, the tone and the rate of accusatory contents, compared to the non-accusatory topics and the distribution of accusatory contents to the media.

1. Newspapers headlines


a. The distribution of the monitored newspapers' headlines among the current issues

The headlines of the first pages and local news in the newspapers were distributed on the various issues presented (the sample consisted of 811 headlines in 88 issues published in April), as follows:

- The Lebanese issue: 625 headlines, i.e. a rate of 77%
- The Yemeni issue: 106 headlines, i.e. a rate of 13%
- The Syrian issue: 40 headlines, i.e. a rate of 5%
- The nuclear negotiations issue: 25 headlines, i.e. a rate of 3%
- The Iraqi issue: 15 headlines, i.e. a rate of 2% (chart 1)

The distribution of the local news headlines in newspapers on the various issues presented.

The sample consisted of 811 headlines in 88 issues published in April
Chart 1.




b. The accusatory speech in the newspapers' headlines

In the analysis of the headlines of the local news in newspapers (accusatory - non-accusatory speech),

the result was: 12% of the overall headlines are accusatory (chart 2).

The analysis of the local news headlines in newspapers (accusatory - non-accusatory speech). The sample consisted of 811 monitored headlines
Chart 2.




c. The distribution of accusatory headlines in newspapers regarding the issues presented

The accusatory headlines in newspapers regarding the issues presented (the sample consists of 98 monitored accusatory headlines (Chart 3) were distributed at the rate of 65.3% for the Lebanese is-

sue (i.e. 64 headlines out of 98), 27% for the Yemeni issue, 6% for the Syrian issue and 1% for the Iraqi issue.

The distribution of accusatory headlines in newspapers regarding the issues presented. The sample consists of 98 monitored accusatory headlines
Chart 3.



d. Distribution of the accusatory headlines regarding the monitored newspapers

Chart 4.

Issues of the hour Stations	Lebanon	Yemen	Syria	Iraq	Total
An-Nahar	7				7
Al-Mustaqbal	15	3	2	1	21
Al Liwaa	12	3			15
Al-Sharq	10		1		11
As-Safir	1		2		3
Ad-Diyar	4	4	1		9
Al Joumhouria	6	3			9
Al-Balad	3	2			5
Al-Akhbar	1	9	1		11
The Daily Star	1		1		2
L'Orient-Le Jour	4	1			5

While the Lebanese issue obtained the highest percentage of accusatory headlines in newspapers, followed by the Yemeni issue (cf. Chart 4), Al-Mustaqbal newspapers recorded the highest rate of accusatory headlines amounting to 21 headlines, followed by Al Liwaa with 15 headlines then Al-Sharq


and Al-Akhbar with 11 accusatory headlines for each newspapers, then Ad-Diyar and Al Joumhouria at 9 headlines, An-Nahar 7 headlines, Al-Balad and L'Orient-Le Jour with 5 headlines, then As-Safir 3 headlines and The Daily Star 2 headlines.

e. The distribution of accusatory headlines in newspapers regarding the addressed topics

The newspapers headlines' topics with accusatory speech (the sample consists of 98 monitored accusatory headlines) were distributed as follows (Chart 5):

- 53% (52 headlines) for the topic of war on Yemen
- 29% (29 headlines) for the topic of Nasrallah speech

- 7% (7 headlines) for the Syrian crisis issue
- 6% (6 headlines) for the topic of vacuum in presidency
- 2% (2 headlines) for the internal affairs issue
- 2% (2 headlines) for other miscellaneous topics
- 1% (1 headline) for the nuclear deal



f. The party targeted by the accusatory speech in the monitored newspapers headlines


The accusatory speech addressed either people or parties or states that are distributed as follows:

- Hezbollah 31% (30 accusatory headlines)
- Nasrallah 25% (24 accusatory headlines)
- KSA 19% (19 accusatory headlines)
- Iran 16% (16 accusatory headlines)
- Future movement, Al Assad and Al Saoud 2% (2 accusatory headlines for each party)
- Hariri, US and Qatar 1% (1 accusatory headline)

That is, 74% is the rate of the total of the targeted party which is considered in a conflict with the opposite side which is also targeted but at a lower rate of 26%.

The party targeted by the accusatory speech in the monitored newspapers headlines.

Chart 6.




The accusatory speech is concentrated in a rate that exceeds 60% of the total monitored accusatory headlines in the headlines of the following newspapers (Chart 7).

The accusatory speech is concentrated in a rate of 60% of the total monitored accusatory headlines in the headlines of the newspapers

Chart 7.

- Iran
- Hezbollah
- Nasrallah
- KSA




2. Headlines of television news bulletins

a. The distribution of television news bulletins' headlines on various presented issues

The distribution of television news bulletins' headlines on various presented issues.

The sample consisted of 147 headlines from 48 television bulletins in April.

Chart 8.



The sample consisted of 147 headlines from 48 television bulletins in April (Chart 8) as follows:

- The Lebanese issue: 96 headlines, i.e. a rate of 65%
- The Yemeni issue: 32 headlines, i.e. a rate of 22%
- The nuclear negotiations issue: 8 headlines, i.e. a rate of 6%
- The Iraqi issue: 6 headlines, i.e. a rate of 4%
- The Syrian issue: 5 headlines, i.e. a rate of 3%

b. The accusatory speech in the television news bulletins


Chart 9 shows the distribution of the percentages of the headlines that included an accusatory speech versus the non-accusatory headlines (the sample amounted to 147 headlines out of 48 tele-

vision news bulletins in April) as follows: 14% of the television news bulletins had an accusatory direction versus 86% that were non-accusatory.

The analysis of television news bulletins (accusatory - non-accusatory speech)

The sample consisted of 147 headlines from 48 television bulletins in April.

Chart 9.




c. The distribution of the accusatory television news bulletins' headlines regarding the issues presented

The accusatory headlines of the television news bulletins (the sample consists of 20 accusatory headlines) were distributed at the rate of 50% for the Lebanese issue then 40% for the Yemeni issue, then the nuclear negotiations and the Iraqi issue at 5%. (Chart 10).

The distribution of the television news bulletins' headlines regarding the issues presented.

The sample consisted of 20 monitored accusatory headlines

Chart 10.



d. Distribution of the accusatory headlines regarding the monitored television channels

Chart 11.

Issues of the hour	Nuclear negotiations	Lebanon	Yemen	Iraq	Total
Stations					
OTV	1	2	1		3
MTV		1			1
Futre		5	2		7
Al Manar	1	1	5	1	8
Al Jadeed		1			1


While the Lebanese issue obtained the highest rate of accusatory headlines, followed by the Yemeni issue (cf. Chart 11), Future TV recorded the highest rate of accusatory headlines in the Lebanese issue which amounted to 5 headlines, while Al Manar registered the highest rate of accusatory headlines in the Yemeni issue amounting to 5 headlines.

e. Distribution of the accusatory headlines of the television news bulletins regarding the topics addressed

The distribution of the television news bulletins' headlines' topics with accusatory speech.

The sample consists of 20 monitored accusatory headlines.


Chart 12.



The topics of the television news bulletins' headlines with an accusatory speech (the sample consists of 20 monitored accusatory headlines (Chart 12) were distributed as follows:

- 65% (113 headlines) for the topic of war on Yemen
- 30% (6 headlines) for the topic of Nasrallah speech
- 5% (1 headline) for other miscellaneous topics

The accusatory speech was concentrated in a rate that exceeds 75% of the total monitored accusatory headlines in the headlines of the television news for both Al Manar and Future TV. The Chart No 20 shows the details of the percentage distribution.




3. Headlines of radio news bulletins

a. The distribution of headlines among the current issues

The headlines of the radio news bulletins were distributed on the various issues presented and the current issues within the sample which consisted of 305 headlines in 64 radio bulletins monitored in April), according to the following percentages:

The headlines were related to the Lebanese issue at a rate of 64% of the total headlines (194 out of 305), then to the Yemeni events at a rate of 20%, 7% to the Syrian issue, 6% to the nuclear negotiations and around 3% to Iraq (Chart No 1)


The distribution of radio news bulletins' headlines on various presented issues. The sample consisted of 305 headlines from 64 radio bulletins in April.
Chart 14.



b. The accusatory speech in the radio bulletins' headlines


Chart 15 shows the distribution of the percentages of the headlines that included an accusatory speech versus the non-accusatory headlines as follows: 9% of the radio news bulletins had an accusatory direction versus 91% that were non-accusatory.

The analysis of radio news bulletins (accusatory - non-accusatory speech)
The sample consisted of 305 headlines from 64 television bulletins in April.
Chart 15.



c. The distribution of accusatory headlines in newspapers regarding the issues presented

The accusatory news bulletins' headlines in radio stations (the sample consists of 29 accusatory headlines) were distributed at the rate of 59% for the Lebanese issue, 31% for the Yemeni issue, 7% for the nuclear negotiations and 3% for the Iraqi issue. (Chart 16).



d. Distribution of the accusatory headlines regarding the monitored radio stations /Chart 17.


Issues of the hour \ Stations	Nuclear negotiations	Lebanon	Yemen	Iraq	Total
Sawt El Mada	1	1			2
Radio Liban		1			1
Radio Liban Libre		9	2		11
Voice of Lebanon (93.3)				1	1
Voice of Lebanon – Achrafieh		1			1
Al-Nour station	1	3	7		11
Radio Orient		2			2

While the Lebanese issue obtained the highest percentage of accusatory headlines, followed by the Yemeni issue (Chart 16), Radio Liban Libre and Al-Nour station recorded the highest rate of accusatory headlines amounting to 11 accusatory headlines for each station out of 29, i.e. around 38% of the total speeches, while the accusatory headlines were distributed among the other stations at an average of two accusatory headlines for both Radio Orient

and Sawt El Mada, and one accusatory headline for Voice of Lebanon – Achrafieh, Voice of Lebanon (93.3) and Radio Liban.

Radio Liban Libre recorded the highest rate of accusatory headlines in the Lebanese issue amounting to 9 headlines, while Al-Nour station recorded the highest rate of accusatory headlines in the Yemeni issue amounting to 7 headlines.


e. The accusatory speech was concentrated in a rate that exceeds 70% of the total monitored accusatory headlines in the news headlines of Al-Nour station and Radio Liban Libre.



f. The distribution of accusatory headlines on various presented issues

The radio bulletins headlines' topics with accusatory speech (the sample consists of 29 monitored accusatory headlines (Chart 18) were distributed as follows:

- 59% (17 headlines) for the topic of war on Yemen
- 21% (6 headlines) for the topic of Nasrallah speech
- 7% (2 headlines) for the topic of vacuum in presidency
- 3% (1 headline) for the Iraqi issue
- 10% (3 headlines) for other miscellaneous topics




g. The party targeted by the accusatory speech in the monitored radio bulletins' headlines

The accusatory speech addressed either people or parties or armed factions or states that are distributed as follows:

- KSA 38% (11 accusatory headlines)
- Iran and Hezbollah equally 21% (6 accusatory headlines for every party)
- Nasrallah 14% (4 accusatory headlines)
- Syria and Houthis 3% (one accusatory headline for every party)

That is, 62% is the rate of the total of the targeted party which is considered in a conflict with the opposite side which is also targeted but at a rate of 38%.



Section 3: Lebanese Media and Incitement to Religious Hatred (Qualitative and Content Analysis)

Section Three was based, in its form and content analysis, on the results that were indicated, qualitatively, in the Section Two.

1. The discourse environment: Time, place and event

In Lebanon, the religious discourse is strongly present and has never been absent; and when conflicts intensify, the level of hatred rises. The regional and internal alliances have helped diminish this level for a period but the recent circumstances have changed the content and tone.

In the study's environment, the religious discourse shows that the war is a "fair" war, one that is ethical by all standards, and "sacred." Media contributes in instilling the conviction that the party-victim is targeted in its religious and moral values and in its

presence and influence. This is exactly what is promoted by each party. This entails the risk of spreading hatred and the legitimacy of confronting the other, who becomes an enemy.

"Al-Hazm Storm" began on March 26, 2015; it is a Saudi military operation with the participation of an international coalition of ten countries against the group "Ansar Allah" (Houthis) and the forces that support them and the former President Ali Abdullah Saleh. Operations continued until April 21, 2015 when the alliance leadership announced the start of Operation Restore Hope, after "the Saudi Ministry of Defense announced the elimination of all threats that pose a threat to the security of Saudi Arabia and the neighbouring countries, after which the heavy weapons, ballistic missiles and the air force which was held by the Houthis militia rebels and the pro-(Ali Abdullah) Saleh were destroyed." (An-Nahar, 21/04/2015).

a. The terminology of political events

Under the title "Washington counts on Saudi Arabia in Yemen to curb a sectarian conflict looming on the horizon," wrote the newspaper", An-Nahar wrote on the first day of the operation: "Although the negotiations on Iran's nuclear program have reached a critical stage, US President Barack Obama did not hesitate to support air strikes waged by a regional alliance led by Saudi Arabia against the Houthis backed by Iran."

So the event's terminology at the beginning are focused on two parties in conflict:

"Regional alliance", "Arab alliance", KSA, Washington (Intelligence and logistics support)	vs	Houthis Militias and pro-Ali Abdullah Saleh forces
--	-----------	--

And regarding the causes of conflict:

Eliminating threat, to prevent any attack against the "Kingdom" and the countries of the region	vs	Heavy weapons and ballistic missiles seized by the Houthis militias and the pro-(Ali Abdullah Saleh) forces from the Yemeni army bases and camps
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This is narrative by the party that started the coalition and launched air strikes on the Houthis.

This military operation was reflected in the media language and the media scene. The course of the operation dominated the front pages and the headlines of the newscasts and ledes, etc, as happened with the US-Iran nuclear deal. These events coincided with interpretations of the conflict and the deal and were reflected in fuelling religious sentiments in particular, with what this fuelling involves of rejection of the other.

We start first with the designation; that of the stronger prevails. Media forms a pillar for this power and an "effect" thereto, i.e. a space that carries and contains residues of all that preceded, and the archive that records the designation.

"Al-Hazm Storm" was dubbed by Al-Manar TV "The Wide-objectives limited-results, even no-achievements aggression", and by Al-Akhbar newsletter "The Saudi-American aggression on Yemen." In contrast, the Future TV dubbed the Operation Restore Hope the "Hope Storm"...

Media gives designations according to its position; designations hold positions. Media does not regard the same event from the same perspective, and thus the interpretations are not only different but also contradicting. While Al-Akhbar gave a headline to the US-Iran nuclear deal in 03/04/2015 in its page #2 "Iran succeeds in seizing a "historic deal", "disappointment and a feeling of failure"; and continues, "Iran succeeded and Israel lost due to the submission of the West to the Iranian will...", and also headlines: "The West succumbs."

An-Nahar writes in its front page: "Lausanne with a "historic" nuclear framework deal, constraints on the Iranian program "peace" in exchange for the sanctions. It continues, "Iran agrees to the transparency system and inspection operations..."; Ad-Diyar, "Iran will turn into a superpower after lifting the sanctions and opening up to the world"; Al-Mustaqbal: "A agreement of standards" prevents Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon and lifts the sanctions according to its compliance to the obligations, Obama: Tehran will undergo the strictest inspection in the world."

b. The religious terminology

Away from the Yemeni event, the religious terminology appear to be very much present in the daily media discourse, headlines, leads, analyses, etc., as well as in the coverage, pictures, display of activities and comments. Examples of this terminology are: "fatwa", "the Patriarch", "supreme leader", "the Islamic Republic", the "fatwas of logic and science", "fatwa Wali al-Faqih (Islamic Jurist)", "the victor conquerors", "martyrs", mourning of muharram (funeral), prayers, doctrine, the Shiites, the Sunnis, Christians, etc...

And a rhetoric metaphor to get the meaning: "... Lebanon and the region" are also crucified on a wooden piece", or on pieces..., "regionally, the wounds are quite open." Yemen is "crucified" by the Huthis and their lethal aspirations and endless adventures. And Syria is "crucified" by a regime that refuses to acknowledge that it is no longer able to govern, and by armed groups trying to take it back to the Middle Ages."(MTV 3/4/2015).

"Pray for the living for those whom your love have gone, and those whom you love are still waiting and have not changed, and wait not for a "prayer in your honour" for all "prayers" are reserved, and each party is "praying" to the beat of its own external drum, from a "mass" in honour of Virgin Mary to a "prayer" in honour of Sayyida Zeinab to "mourning of muharram", among which we have not observed an "absentee prayer" for the return of the Lebanese to their senses and for their election of a president". (Al-Jadid, 7/4/2015).

2. The employment of the religious discourse

a. The Lebanon of Coexistence (among religions)

In each discourse, there is a use of strategy that displays the other (the enemy), its statements and actions within the villainy system, while displaying itself, its statements and actions within the goodness system. Of course, the reading takes place once and is conclusive, i.e. not multiple and not subject to re-reading.

"Religion is not a mere approach of ideas; it is an approach of powers foremost... Religion is characterized by the invigorating impact of the energy it practices on the consciences"¹. Religion affects the methods of thinking in a society, particularly in religious states. In these states, it is the criteria for villainy and goodness, for example: "... The prisoners of evil, slavery, ideologies, and dogmatism in opinion and attitude, these are more dangerous than those who are behind bars because countries are collapsing because of them and society is losing its meanings. Christ has come to free them all and to lead them to the right path". (Al-Rahi on Maundy from Roumieh prison, "Al-Balad", April 3, 2015).

The religious discourse can be an optimistic discourse, especially since it "carries the truth" and defends it: "We are supported because we forgive the enemies and love them, but this is rejected by man as a human

¹ The Sociology of Religions archive, Issue no 27, The current religious sentiment, Critique of the political mind, Dar al-Adab, Translated by Afif Dimashkieh, 1986, p. 175.

being; he must enjoy a strong faith to be able to that. Man can love the enemy in such a way that he wishes good upon them and wishes to direct them to the path of the truth and reality. And Jesus has told us: "If they persecuted me, they will persecute you also. If they love me, they will love you also". And we know that we are persecuted and Jesus had said "Whoever wants to be my disciple must deny themselves and take up their cross daily and follow me", and we walk with Jesus and we preach this to the people so that they can live this Christian faith that requires not words but deeds; a Christian testimony of words, deeds and prayers and this is a blessing from the Lord. Martyrdom is tantamount to an invitation from the Lord; it is not easy for a human being to sacrifice his life when innocent. The apostles of Jesus followed him and so do our parents; we are Jesus' disciples and apostles". (His Beatitude Nerses Bedros XIX Catholicos Patriarch of Cilicia of Armenian Catholics, NNA, April 22, 2015)

Grand Mufti Sheikh Abdul-Latif Derian affirms the exclusion of Lebanon off of the ideology of extremism: "The Lebanese people are against terrorism and extremist ideologies and behaviours shall have no place in Lebanon. Lebanon's youth are our responsibility, we have to lead them towards all that is in their interest and that of their country" (Grand Mufti Sheikh Abdul-Latif Derian, Al-Balad, April 22, 2015) "... and continue the message of enhancing stability and civil peace" (Derian, Al- Joumhouria, April 22, 2015).

In normal times, i.e. not during times of crises, Lebanon appears in the media discourse as a symbol of tolerance and coexistence. From an internal as well as an external point of view, it is considered from the point of view of internal and external also the

antithesis of its surrounding communities when talking about pluralism and political representation. In defence of the formula and coexistence, the particularity of Lebanon stands out in the political speech (albeit sometimes by a religious authority) while holding on to it; the terminology of the Constitution, the Charter and the formula is synonymous with the success of coexistence.

"He stressed on the maintenance and protection of the Constitution, the Charter and the formula; the three integral pillars. He also stressed the need to assist the international community to help maintain the social pluralism in the region and which is based on the Muslim-Christian coexistence". (Patriarch Al-Rahi; meeting between Al-Rahi and the ambassadors of the great powers, "An-Nahar" - April 17)

But Lebanon also is the "arena", i.e. the "wars of others are fought on its ground" or the "wars for others." Historically, its wars have been, in large part, a reason for this diversity and a result thereof. "Lebanon's strength resides in its weakness," is a mere reference to the Lebanese structure and to its immunity through consensus, and at the same time the easiness of sliding into sectarian conflict. And as the term "Lebanon the message" refers to the surroundings and to being different from it, it carries an indication of the success of religious promiscuity or pluralism. Religious promiscuity in Lebanon and the political dialogue between the denominations and sects have been explicitly referenced, but more often than not under the title of "necessity"; the dialogue of necessity, the dialogue for security.

The war of words between the "Future Movement" and "Hizbollah" occupies the biggest space, media-wise, and the front page headline:

"... The dialogue of necessity continues" (Al-Balad, April 16, 2015).

And elsewhere: al-Machnouk: The dialogue with Hezbollah to alleviate burns (Nouhad al-Machnouk, Minister of Interior and Municipalities, Al-Moustaqbal, April 3, 2015). It is Lebanon "the arena" and Lebanon "the message."

b. The political interpretation of the discourse

Under the sectarian conflict and religious extremism afflicting the region, there is a political discourse that carries the dimensions of the religious conflict. In an editorial by Aouni al-Kaaki, he writes: "The State of Velayat-e faqih, in honour of Velayat-e faqih; we ask Hezbollah: Return to Lebanon ... If the state of Velayat-e faqih helps it in the liberation, Lebanon has been liberated; why then does the flow of money there to continue..." (Al-Sharq, April 3, 2015).

And in a speech by MP Georges Adwan entitles "The same scene in the 21st session to elect the president", Adwan: what state does Hezbollah look forward to: "Our main problem is that we consider that you alone have taken the decision to go to Syria and Iraq, and that you have taken independent decisions beyond the institutions, and you tell us that? There are two issues: Hezbollah acts as a state on its own regarding all major matters, but there are more important matters in the part in which we share as a Lebanese state." He says: "You must not act without us," ... If Hezbollah was annoyed by the position of Prime Minister Tammam Salam, and his is a balanced position with balanced words, for he has looked for the appropriate words and tried to balance them with the stance of Lebanon, why then did it consider that this position does not represent that of all the Lebanese, that we cannot take such positions and

that we have not discussed them and have not agreed on everything." April 3, 2015.

And as a matter of equality between the "patrons" of sects, it appears that the intervention of Hezbollah in Syria is equivalent to the intervention of Saudi Arabia in Yemen: "Why have they not rejected the Iranian intervention in Iraq and Syria?" Nouhad al-Machnouk (Al-Mustaqbal, April 3, 2015).

Geagea was surprised of "how would Saudi Arabia and ten states have no right of intervention in Yemen while Sayyid Hassan has the right of intervention in Syria, where is the logic there?" (Al-Joumhouria, April 3, 2015).

In Future TV's bulletin on April 23, 2015: Hariri (during his visit to Washington) as the one to provide the essentials of protecting Lebanon from the regional repercussions. He describes the Iranian intervention in the region as unconstructive: Interference in the Arab affairs is an unwanted interference, whoever wishes to have a constructive intervention shall assist the State and not "a political team to intimidate another team" (in Lebanon or in any other Arab country).

"The art of elevating the level of sectarian clashes on Facebook and Twitter tweets was very much present at the Ain al-Tineh round table of dialogue, between the Future Movement and Hezbollah, who have held the 9th meeting in frantic atmosphere following the Yemeni event"... (Al Liwaa, April 3, 2015)

In such contents, the speech and the media attempt to focus on logic as an efficacious argument. Yet, in parallel, the media resorts, at the same time, takes to stirring emotions, for along with the religious dimension, they prevail.

c. The versatility of the religious discourse

The goals of the religious discourse uses vary; they change according to the requirement of the owner of the speech. Among these uses:

1. ENSURING CONSENSUS: Speeches are keen to stress on the Lebanese partisanship and the Christian-Muslim unity and harmony as an internal protection in the face of the crisis taking place in the region, as well as on the Muslim-Muslim communication.

“The importance of national unity and meeting of the Lebanese society components to face the challenges that are afflicting the Arab region and Lebanon,” calling for “communication and particularly the Christian-Muslim communication and the Muslim-Muslim communication to steer away from the darkness of what is taking place around us” (The Islamic Group, upon wishing St. Saviour Convent a happy Easter, Al-Mustaqbal, April 8).

2. DEFENDING THE SECT: Also prevailing in media are reports or news that transmit the views and invitations of religious authorities while discussing the matters of the sect and defending its interests, values and image. This holds reference to that the religious discourse is an official discourse that is being consumed in the media, politically and socially.

“Calling everyone to consider the interest of the sect at this point, away from any other considerations.” (Derian, Dar Al Fatwa meeting, Al-Sharq, April 16).

“Islam negates immoderation and extremism, particularly if in the name of religion, and calls for moderation; whoever claims that the terrorism or extremism they exercise is in the name of Islam is rather misguided and a sinner.” (Derian, during a visit to Germany, “Al-Liwaa” – April 22).

“The cooperation between Dar Al Fatwa and the German Berghof Foundation aims at developing and building a sound Muslim society that is based on the concept of equality, brotherhood and moderation” (Derian, cooperation between Dar Al Fatwa and “Berghof”, Al-Mustaqbal, April 23).

- The Armenian cause is a just cause. The centennial anniversary of the genocide is a reminder for us all, including the international community and Turkey, that our cause is a just cause. The Armenian genocide is a historic reality that can be neither denied nor forgotten” (The Armenian centennial, Armenian Apostolic Church of Cilicia Aram I Kishicaan, An-Nahar, April 23).

- The celebration that will be held in Armenia will be in sanctification of the martyrs and we have been invited to participate in it and there will be a specific program for the occasion. We pray in honour of all the martyrs who have fallen, whether of the Armenians, Syrians or Assyrians who were present in this major disaster” (Al-Rahi, a visit to Armenia, An-Nahar- April 22).

3. EXPRESSING CONCERNS: The logic of fear prevails and controls the group of sect; each sect observes its own powers, shares,

presence and representation.

“The necessity of activating the Christian presence in the State and its administrations without going into the narrow sectarian and political alleyways” (Father Khadra, Father Khadra during his honouring ceremony, Al-Mustaqbal, April 16).

“Did the Muslims grasp the Christians’ concerns and understood them? And if the Christians had grasped the concerns of the Muslims and understood them, couldn’t we have been able overcome what happened?” (Rafik Ghanme from the Phalange Party, a Religions Forum seminar, Al-Balad, April 16).

4. SOCIAL MORALS AND HOLIDAY GREETINGS: According to the holiday and the concerned community, media is keen on covering the morals of greetings. Politicians are keen on offering holiday greetings to the different sects. News bulletins also start off with offering holiday greetings to the concerned sect.

“Speaker Berri called to felicitate each of President General Michel Suleiman, the Maronite Patriarch Bechara Boutros Al-Rahi, Patriarch of Antioch and All the East for the Melkite Greek Catholics Gregory III Laham, (Berri, Easter Holiday for the Christian communities, Al-Liwaa, April 9)

5. CARING FOR THE MATTERS OF THE DENOMINATIONS Since the country is sectarian, par excellence, the administrative and social matters related to the sects take up their own space in the media.

- “The subject of the meeting is finding a consensus formula for the elections of the Islamic Supreme Council in Beirut and electing the members of the Administrative Council of Islamic Endowment in Tripoli.” (al-Shaar, PM Najib Mikati visited Mufti of Tripoli and North Lebanon Sheikh Malek al-Shaar at his residence in Tripoli, Al-Mustaqbal, April 17)

- “The Patriarch honouring MP Nidal Tohme” (Report, Honouring ceremony, Al-Mustaqbal, April 22)

The media morals regarding the sects and their respect towards them are equivalent to their respect to the sanctities and their reference to any concern they might encounter. This performance falls under the respect for others and their sanctities and the respect for the self and its sanctities.

- “The Lebanese in general and the Maronites in particular were shocked with yesterday’s news coming from Jerusalem regarding the destruction of tombstones in a Christian Maronite cemetery in the village of Kafr Bir’im, close to the borders with Lebanon” (Investigation, Destruction of tombstones in a Christian Maronite cemetery in the village of Kafr Bir’im, An-Nahar, April 16).

d. The demanding voice

The religious authority has its say in expressing political matters related to a political position pertaining to the sect. Under the current situation, the opinion of the Christian religious authority concerned with the “Christian” Presidency of the Republic has taken the lead in media as was the

situation with the delay in government formation (The Sunni authority):

- “After nine months of presidential vacuum, Patriarch Al-Rahi has done nothing but urge the Free Patriotic Movement and the Lebanese Forces to start a dialogue regarding the presidential elections, while he is well aware that such dialogue would lead to no result in light of General Michel Aoun holding on to his candidacy” (Opinion and analysis of Al-Rahi, After nine months of disruption in the presidential elections, Al- Joumhouria, April 9).
- “Life returned to the presidential elections “verbally” through the statement of the ambassadors after their meeting with the Maronite Patriarch Cardinal Mar Bechara Boutros al-Rahi” (opinion, statement of the ambassadors, Al-Balad – April 17).
- Al-Rahi mobilizes internationally for the presidency... (cover page) (Al-Balad – April 16, 2015)
- Al-Rahi to the world: We want a president... Help us (cover page) (Al-Sharq – April 17, 2015)
- “The patriarch let out a cry for help, hoping it will be the last”, appealing to the international community to support the presidential elections and counting on the interim agreement that was reached in Lausanne between the United States and Iran, which is supposed to constitute the beginning of a solution to many pending files in the region, including the Lebanese presidential elections, considered as the key to local crises at different levels.

Al-Rahi held the ambassadors responsible of the presidential vacuum, based on their representation of the acting states on the Lebanese scene, in light of the pressure towards performing a role in line with

putting an end to the presidential vacuum.” (Al-Rahi, meeting of the ambassadors of the states members of the Security Council at Bkerke, Al-Balad – April 17).

- “The necessity” of the immediate cessation of transferring Lebanon’s problems abroad, and starting to be a part of them and disagree with each other for the foreign affairs; the basic and foremost legislation of need is summarized by the election of a President of the Republic. There is nothing more necessary than electing a president (Al-Rahi, Al-Rahi started a visit to Armenia then to France where he meets Hollande, Al-Mustaqbal, April 22)

e. The speech of suffering and fear for oneself

Some of the religious speech bore a return to the vocabulary of war and kidnapping based on religion and sect.

- “Raising the voice and claiming not to forget both their cases.” (Orthodox meeting, two years have passed since the kidnapping of both archbishops of Aleppo Yohanna Ibrahim and Boulos Yazigi, An-nahar April 16)
- “Yazigi organizes a prayer day for the two kidnapped archbishops” (Archbishop John X of Antioch, primate of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Antioch and All the East, the second annual memorial for the two bishops, Al-Balad, April 16).

The cycle of fear emerges with the aggravation of the events – an indicator of projects in which the sects see a threat to their existence, along with what it entails in terms of displacement and killing on a sectarian basis...

“The visit takes on an important aspect given the situation of Christians in the Middle East, for the Christians in Iraq and Syria are talking today about their forced migration, the destruction of their monuments and their religious heritage. We are witnessing the emptying of the Middle East of one of its Christian components that were present for more than two thousand years. Why is all of this happening? Why are they facing this destiny and are now confronting migration, while they lived for two thousand years with the Byzantines, the Muslims and the Ottomans.” (Archbishop Gemayel, press conference for the Archbishop Gemayel on the patriarchal visit and the inauguration of the Diocese headquarters in France, An-nahar – April 17).

At the Orient Christian level, the Maronite Patriarch will speak as “one of the few Orient ecclesiastic authorities who enjoy a moral weight and a complete freedom of speech and movement”, according to an ecclesiastic source and that, in order to raise the voice high and warn of the tragic destiny the Christians of the East are facing based on their suffering in Iraq and Syria, without forgetting the occupied Palestine. The source asks in this context: Can one imagine the Orient without its Christians? (Al-Rahi, The visit of the Maronite Patriarch Bechara Al-Rahi to France, Al Liwaa – April 23).

The Bishop of the Maronite parish of Jbeil Michel Aoun considered that “the Armenian determination to claim justice increases our faith to call all Christians in Lebanon and the East to stop fearing, surrendering and depressing, for the light of resurrection is always present in our life, facing the hardships and big sacrifices we go through”, observing that “our history invites us to hold on to the land and stop fearing and backing up, because many hardships faced us in the past and were tougher than those we are facing today.

We have to be united and determined to remain, along with our partners, in the nation and our open moderate Muslim brothers, so as to fight, side by side, the extremism and intolerance.” (Al Joumhouria, April 3, 2015).

Media can easily fall into generalized fear and fear of generalization. When the news is related to foreign affairs and headlines the cover page, when it is repeated and media uses expressions that draw the picture and the slander, fear might cross continents in some circumstance to become a fear of the neighbour:

“Al-Shabaab” Islamists broke into a university in Kenya and killed 147 non Muslims;

“In the biggest massacre of its kind in this country located in the east of Africa... Survivors reported that the armed men were masked and armed with machine guns “AK – 47”, and that they released the Muslim students and seized the Christians and others as hostages before killing them without mercy” (An-nahar, April 3, 2015).

The War of Yemen on the Internal Front

1 - The political events and the image of the other

The media communicated the political and security events from a religious perspective, hence the ease of slipping into incitement. The understanding of the concept of incitement was never absent from the media in all its directions, for it was directly referenced: “...When Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi made inciting speeches covered with a sectarian character, and

said that the Yemeni flag will be raised in Mount Maran (Ansar Allah's stronghold) instead of the Iranian flag," he did not know that asking help from the Saudi aggression on his country will not prevent Ansar Allah and the army from progressing towards the presidential palace in Eden, to raise the Yemeni republic flag there, which is exactly what happened yesterday." (Al-Akhbar, April 3, 2015).

The instances where the concept "incitement" is used and which are circulating in the media or making the headlines of its news abounds.

"Monitoring of the "open" Yemeni war... And the Saudi intervention

Who controls the "wrong mobilization" at the Lebanese level? (As-Safir, April 3, 2015).

All the danger lies in the indirect.

When the situations are in a state of consensus, it applies to the concepts. But at times of crisis, the negative concepts demeaning the other party and the qualifications abound. For instance, the party is referred to as religiously affiliated, and is called militia: "The militias following Iran are looting Tikrit" (Al-Mustaqbal, April 3, 2015). "Shiite militia members following Iran" for a negative connotation and is accompanied by a lexical field such as: "the atrocities and violations", "involvement", "Theft and looting of the properties of the residents", "burning houses and stores to hide the trace of the thefts under the pretext of being bombed", "some of which belong to previous high-ranked officers in the era of the late Iraqi president Saddam Hussein who have participated in the Iraqi-Iranian war (1980 – 1988), which anchors the fears of the militias going out of control and attempting to perform reprisals on a sectarian basis." ... "The sources revealed that "Shiite militias diffused in the city streets pictures of the Iranian Leader Ali Khamenei and the late Khomeini, in addition to the proliferation of writings in Persian talking about the

Iranian revenge", "after the expulsion of the ISIS members from most parts of the city, until the episodes of atrocities and violations began unveiling the involvement of members of Shiite militias following Iran in the theft and looting of properties of Tikrit residents.

"The Shiite Iraqi militias do not actually need the party (Hezbollah). They get operational quality assistance from the Revolutionary Guards" (MP Walid Jumblatt, Al Joumhouria (April 3, 2015).

"The terrorists of Abdulmalik al-Huthi", "The militias of Al-Huthi... target civilians randomly... in addition to looting stores and houses after taking hold of them. In addition, Houthis opened fire on prayers following the Friday prayer..." (Future TV news bulletin on April 3, 2015).

Meanwhile, As-Safir refers to the two conflicting categories by "the militias of Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi" (As-Safir, April 3, 2015) and "Ansar Allah clan" (As-Safir, April 3, 2015).

The power of the exclusion speech lies in the adornment of oneself and demeaning the other. It is a mental apologetic strategy aiming, through the manipulation of emotions, at reaching its goal, i.e. convincing the recipient and directing the truth to a specific place that the speech generator aspires to, so the inferences are disguised and the other appears in the image of a monster and an aggressor. Often the tone escalates while using this strategy.

"Among the new facets of the aggression, KSA prevented an Iranian aid plane from landing in Sana'a airport to rescue the victims of the assault, despite the calls of the UN agencies to rescue Yemenis, so that those who survived are being killed by missiles and internationally forbidden arms become victims

of hunger and disease. It is the disease of the nation that only sees through bribes and gifts that are limited to revenge, hatred and conflicts. (Al Manar, April 3, 2015).

Hezbollah continues its attack on Arabs and Al Mustaqbal. (Al Mustaqbal, April 16, 2015).

Under the headline: "Nasrallah in a new Iranian speech: KSA has been debased... Thank you Syria", Almodon website stated: "...Practically, Nasrallah is considered as minister of foreign affairs of Iran in Arab affairs, according to what an eminent political source described to Almodon, indicating that Nasrallah speaks on behalf of the Iranian politics regarding the military affairs, while Mohammad Javad Zarif handles the negotiations with the international community...Nasrallah started his speech on a high tone... Later on, President Saad Hariri replied violently to Nasrallah, in a tone he never used before, since he described the speech as "an assorted party of historical slanders, a digging in the graves of grudges and an overt revelation of the grudges lying deep within against KSA, its founders and its command", calling Hezbollah a "local proxy of the Iranian influence..." (Almodon website, April 17, 2015).

The other appears as having a scheme for domination, a "golden" project, contrarily to the project that the speaker or the media speaking defends:

... "And he reiterated his fear "that lifting sanctions might provide more money and resources to the Iranian government, so as to increase its interference and influence in the region, i.e. that Iranian behaviour in the region, from Syria to Iraq and Yemen, regardless of Lebanon", indicating that "Lebanon is not part of the Iranian parade, for the Iranian parade in Lebanon fulfilled its duties and does not need more parades", affirming that "you cannot be an Arab, and be against the decisive storm. And if the accusation against the

Arabs consists of considering them delinquent, then we find for the first time an Arab leadership that is acting according to the principle that it is a decision maker, a big and poignant, wakes up Arabism back inside every Arab, and that the Arabs are concerned and responsible and capable of stopping this Iranian expansion which takes various forms in all its meanings."

He also made it clear that "this mobilization is an Arab mobilization, not only a Sunni mobilization, unless we wanted to consider that the other mobilization is Shiite, for the Sunni – Shiite conflict is well-known in various regions of the Arab world, due to the Iranian proliferation," emphasizing that "talks about the decisive storm are American and are absolutely erroneous. America knew about it a few hours ahead", reminding that "the Saudis have already entered Bahrain and the American minister of defense was visiting them. He then issued a statement after he left in which he reproached and blamed them for not informing him of the operation of entering Bahrain." (Minister of Interior and Municipalities Nouhad El Machnouk (Al Mustaqbal, April 3, 2015).

The enemy is sectarian and more: "digs the history of ethnic riots" (April 7, 2015 Al Liwaa). (Mufti Jouzou: Iran digs the history of ethnic riots" (April 7, 2015 Al Liwaa).

Victory for oneself and defeat for the opponent: "Whoever listened to Obama realizes that what he said about the agreement does not belong to the victories of the American nation. He was forced to summon the agreement that his ancestors concluded against the Soviet Union and Cuba to ward off wars, as he alleged." Then showing oneself in a strong position: "The Islamic Republic did not weaken, nor did its negotiators who were welcomed in Tehran the

welcome of the victorious conquerors" (Al Manar, April 3, 2015).

And in the position of "the honest" and "a guarantee" even from the point of view of "the enemies", with what is adequate with the identity of the speech and the religious personality: "An understanding whose guarantee is the Fatwa of the Supreme Leader of Iran, said Obama. We expected it to come from Mohammad Javad Zarif, to assert it in front of his western negotiators when asked about guarantees, or in Friday speeches of Imams in Qom and Tehran when asked about the reasons and motives for negotiation, but it came from the master of the White House, so the credit becomes what enemies testified. When the Fatwa of the Supreme Leader becomes a guarantee, it can be taught in the hallways of the theorists of the political negotiation between nations. This way, the gap between the fatwa of reason and science and the fatwa permitting killing and decisiveness widens. Whoever issued and financed it did not instruct that it permits a massacre against innocent children and does not stop an advance that links Eden to Sana'a."

The image of the other: "foolish people," "slacks and traffickers, or the frightened and weak." (Al Manar, April 3, 2015).

The media might contribute, in its headlines, to the absorption of the sectarian charging, for the tone differs between the headlines: "Jouzo: Iran digs the history of ethnic riots" and "Jouzo: Intolerance turns man into a hating animal" (As-Safir, April 5, 2015).

In the details, the tone remains the same: "the worst that man can be cursed with is blind intolerance, fanaticism to ethnicity or tribe or sect. Intolerance turns man into a hating animal practicing the most hideous of types of hatred and sectarian killings..."

The Islamic civilization was cursed, in its various eras, with waves of ethnic intolerance. This intolerance came from the populists who adhered forcefully to Islam and their destructive hatred formed a reason to stirring up the sectarian riots that destroy the moral and human values and hinder the march of the Islamic civilization. History has recorded in favour of the Persians malicious positions against the Arabs, during the Umayyad era and the Abbasid era, and the end of the cultural and intellectual renaissance was by those Persians... The sectarians and confessionals who have complexes will be defeated same as before. The populists will be defeated a second and third time. They turned Islam into tribal, pagan and human fanaticism, neglected the Islamic principles, stirred up riots, spread terrorism in the Arab countries and destroyed many Islamic civilization monuments..." (As-Safir, April 5, 2015).

In the representations of oneself and the other, this speech is not devoid of argumentation that fuels the position and plays on the emotional effects, sometimes from the logic and explanation angle: "Iran is the only state in the Islamic world that does not state in its constitution that its religion is Islam. It says that the sect of the state is the Twelver Shia Islam, which definitely causes a schism wherever the Iranian politics are spread, whilst the state religion in KSA, Egypt and all Islamic states is Islam, which has nothing to do with sects. Al-Azhar acknowledges all Islamic sects with no exception," indicating that "there are three religious states in the region. The first one is Israel, the second one Iran, which was self-proclaimed by the Providence of the Jurist and is responsible of Shiites all over the world, and the third religious state is ISIS" (Al-Mustaqbal, April 3, 2015).

The representations comprise a reference to racism:

"Hezbollah does not deny that it is part of the Providence of the Jurist, that the supremacy of the Persians is well-known and that they look down on others, and if the political opinion of this authority is different from that of the country in which Hezbollah lives, it has to follow this authority; this was stated by Hashemi Rafsanjani, when he said: "Insulting Sahabah lead us to ISIS... the celebration of the killing of Sahabah and Caliph Umar ibn Al-Khattāb has led to the emergence of terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS... Rafsanjani is one of the founders of the Islamic revolution in Iran, and he is in a key position in the Iranian regime." (Al-Mustaqbal, April 3, 2015).

2 - Media Speech on Media

In this random sample, the media had a speech about incitement and mobilization, referencing therein the "media" tools of the opponent and the tools of the "media opponent", welcoming and emphasizing at the same time the Sunni-Shiite dialogue in Lebanon (Future – Hezbollah) and acknowledging "mobilization" at all levels, "politically, media-wise, sect-wise and confession-wise":

"In front of the lack of vision, the two parties pay attention, despite the escalating tone used in the discourse and media exchange, not to go far in the political challenge, and avoid causing any shock or reaction that can result in dangerous repercussions and results, for both parties realize they have no interest in taking that road: the supporters of the war, with the Future movement in the lead, are not capable initially to enter into a confrontation internally and win. Those who refuse that war, with Hezbollah at the front, despite being the stronger internally, do not want to create before them an additional front in Lebanon. Therefore they agree, even if reluctantly, to

keep the internal front relatively calms, hence their emphasis on the continuation of the dialogue. Despite that, this reading cannot completely dissipate the concerns for the situation, or assert that it won't slide into unforeseen places, for it fears that what it calls "the wrong mobilization" increasing at all levels, politically, media-wise, sect-wise and confession-wise will escalate to a level where things will reach a phase in which those who were able to adopt the policy of self-control during the recent years, will no longer be able to control themselves in front of this escalation and its development, therefore entering into a costly problem" (Nabil Haytham, monitoring the "open" Yemeni war... and the Saudi intervention, who controls "the wrong mobilization" in Lebanon? (As-Safir, April 3, 2015).

Media fought by media: the daily briefing provided by the Al-Hazm Operation spokesperson in Future TV station gets a reply from Al-Manar station using a recording it prepared and gets aired in the bulletin before starting Yemen news, under the headline "the aggression" in red, with pictures of victims, children, screaming and crying, with a musical background, then the complementary headline reads: "Aggression on Yemen" (April 3, 2015).

Examples are numerous and they become in turn media subjects. An instance is what was mentioned in an article published on the Now website:

"The Minister of Interior Nouhad Machnouk went out of the "venting" dialogue in Ain al-Tineh hurriedly because he was committed to a dinner in Phoenicia, where he took the stage and gave a speech to the attendance with his deep baritone voice, declaring that the Iranian "Illusion storm" will not win in the Arab region as long as the Saudi heart is still beating. In a quality reply to the "republics" Iranian Leader Ali Khamenei, Machnouk said: "Shall wipe his nose in the soil whoever professed the culture of abolition,

aggression, falsification of wills and insulting legitimacies"... Let us consider Thursday night as a warm-up for Friday, and following the speech, the Future TV news bulletin lede was crowned king of rhetoric, and this is merely the tip of the Queen iceberg..." (Sayyed) history to broadcast more fabrications and illusions against the Kingdom (...) so he turned into a strategic military expert talking about the map of the battle in the Yemeni interior territory as if he was talking about the details of Bint Jbeil battle."

The abovementioned article continued: "Al-Manar started its news bulletin with the praise, veneration and reverence inspired from the dictionary of literature in the beginnings of Islam: 'It is a cry of justice, a support of each oppressed. These are the rational words, echoed in the heart and the objective is clear... It does not fear threats, it is ready for all considerations and it does not fear the blame of a critic.' Awesome! Really, this is the first time since I got addicted to this great profession, the press... [...] 'The aggression on Yemen is like the July aggression on Lebanon; the mind is one, the management is one, the killing is one and the result will be one. The victory of Yemen is like Lebanon's victory in 2006, it was achieved by the strategic patience in the face of aggression'." ("Some Venting", Imad Musa, Now, 19 April 2015).

Under the title "Explosion of the Rules of Engagement between Al-Manar and the Future TV," Nadhir Rida wrote on Almodon website: "... The soft harassment and critical hints were eliminated when media rifles began to extend beyond the mind space. A response and counter responses... The status quo continues since days between two falcons, a Sunni and a Shiite, one supports Tehran and the other opposes it (I am sorry for using this sectarian classification, but this is the reality of the situation)... And the war is an inevitable consequence of the fall in the abyss whose

40th anniversary Lebanese are commemorating on 13 April. Cannons were replaced by male and female news anchors, all using "clichés" extinct from the battlefield, along with the escalation. The two parties allegedly baptise this as the "dialogue." Reality has gone beyond that, forcing congestion to the peak. It is certain that the uncontrolled political breakdown that we are witnessing is not a mere inter-war or divisions on stances; it is rather a pre-clash mobilization that reinforces a war rejected by the two parties (in the media at least) and so-called the Sunni-Shiite war. (Almodon, April 14, 2015).

Another example:

"In the past, they were barricades of sand. Today, they are electronic barricades, platforms on screens, sports arenas, schools, university elections, unions, songs and introductions of news bulletins... Did anyone watch the 'two bombs' on the Future TV and Al-Manar few days ago? Two introductions to news bulletins that constitute a warm 'delivery' for a ready civil war project with complete elements; it only needs the push of a button so we celebrate the huge explosion!" (Lebanon Files, April 15, 2015)

These are examples that indicate the media performance, but it is quite noticeable that media sites have addressed this topic by criticizing the performance of TV outlets in particular.

3 - Bickering

In Al-Manar, the ongoing fighting in Yemen is "fighting between the Yemeni troops and Saudi-backed armed militias affiliated with outgoing president Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi," "the armed forces' preoccupation with the defence of the Yemeni territory in the face of Saudi Arabia and its allies at home allowed Al-Qaeda to expand...", "coastal defence force..."

In the news bulletin of the Future TV, Nasrallah's

picture is accompanied by the title: "Nasrallah's speech is fabrications and illusions." (April 17, 2015).

Print media walks in the footsteps of audiovisual media outlets: "The response of the Minister of Interior and Municipalities Nohad Machnouk on Hezbollah and Iran entailed a response to that response by Hizballah yesterday." According to media information, the party is continuing his media mobilization in defence of Yemenis, as per a systematic plan that started with the speech of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, then his televised interview, followed by a series of popular activities, a meeting with a crowd of people and another high-toned speech, to be followed with other steps as long as the Decisive Storm continues. In its response, Hezbollah launched an attack on the Future Movement and its leaders in defence of Iran, describing the accusations against Tehran as worthless and baseless fabrications that serve foreign plans and Arab and foreign agendas. (Al-Balad, 16 April 2015)

This was preceded by the title on the front page: "... the Iranian embassy foreruns Nasrallah's speech by responding to Machnouk." (Al-Liwa, 17 April 2015)

Argumentative methods in speeches and response speeches include the high-pitched voice and silence, and their role in some clips, the repetition to convey a certain message, the storytelling about the same topic, the reference to the incident's place and date, the tendency to use concrete materialized instead of abstract expressions and the choice of expressions with an argumentative value related to concepts.

In the introduction of Al-Manar's news bulletin on 23 April 2015 at the end of the Decisive Storm, and in order to balance the name with the "Operation Restore Hope" name used after it ended, the channel adopted a slow method: 2,450 or more raids, around 3,700

martyred and injured Yemenis and hundreds of buildings and facilities destroyed, including schools, mosques and hospitals, are the initial outcome of the aggression with large scale goals and limited, or even nonexistent achievements. This is how the channel summed up what it called "the Saudi-American aggression," "the crime," "the collective massacres," "the murder with missiles and internationally banned weapons," a turn towards "selective attacks" that lasted for four weeks.

The terms used were very short and far from listing or stopping at results in the introduction of the news bulletin of the Future TV on the same day on 23 April 2015: "... Regionally, the breezes of Hope Storm started to blast across Yemen with the launch of the operation aimed at healing the wounds of Yemeni citizens, although the Houthi militias are determined to continue their attacks in Taiz.

The Saudi-led alliance faced acts of sabotage targeting the headquarters and sites of the Houthis in the Dali city and the headquarters of Al-Dailami air base in the capital Sana'a."

The two channels used the same rhetorical style to talk about the American-Iranian agreement on 4 March 2015. This topic was not the first in the introduction of the news bulletin of the Future TV. "Another question was also posed today on whether the framework agreement signed between Iran and the West will mark the beginning of the resolution of the crises in the region, along with the gradual lifting of sanctions on Iran."

On the details of the Iranian file: "Tehran made major concessions and claims it made concessions." This was the title of the report. How did the press cover the American-Iranian agreement, "especially in the

countries whose militias are affiliated with the Wilayat al Faqih.”

“A comprehensive unprecedented Sunni rallying around the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which means that the Muslim Brotherhood, the Salafis and the trends adopted the same position, which never happened in all the modern Arab history. Today, Iran may not be in hostility with the two Arab and international sides... It will end a dream it long cherished: the possession of weapons of mass destruction.”

In the caricature: No more conflict between the axis of evil and the Great Satan (each side tears a paper). It was signed by Armand Homsy in An-Nahar and the Future TV showed it as part of the way social media dealt with the topic.

Among the titles of Al-Manar: Iranians are celebrating the recognition of their nuclear right. It was read by the news anchor with only the expression “praise be to God” for Rouhani and “thank you” for Netanyahu, followed by the quote “the Lausanne Agreement is an existential threat.”

In the details of the lede: Slowness was also adopted for the narrative since the first sentence with the terms “patience,” “weaved,” “spun” and “the register of long years”: “With the patience mode, the Islamic Republic of Iran weaved what its opponents described as a historical agreement. It did not flirt with the West, but spun its conditions on the register of long years and arduous negotiations, proving the failure of the strength rationale in the face of the stability of the power of logic...”

4 - Resuming the War Speech

In their coverage of the events in Yemen, media

outlets took the Lebanese down memory lane, back to the years of war. It took them back to an atmosphere charged with fear and hatred towards the other. All media outlets covered the events with projections on the Lebanese situation through several forms:

- The sharp Shiite-Sunni division (this feeds sectarian incitement and speech) and that what is happening, such as recalling the recent past, rhetorically and in summary gives an image for the word “sliding” and summarizes all explanation attempts.
- The benefiting from dialogue, notably the Sunni-Shiite dialogue, and putting an end to discussing sectarian incitement based on Yemen and the repercussions (here, fortifying the country domestically and calling for reverting to local authorities without being loyal to foreign parties) (and the dialogue guarantees not reverting back to war). Calls for solidarity as a protection method in face of what is happening.
- Or neutralizing Lebanon's position on purpose, and this also takes the country back to the past and urges learning from past experiences. The utilitarian memory.

Even the country's clichés are present: There is the modern image; the images of war in Yemen are taken by satellites, and hold an explanation and sign on the site targeted, then the latter is bombed like in movies. (April 23, 2015, new bulletin of the Future TV)

Like the old way: The war language on the war's 40th anniversary:

- War is picture-based: The pictures of war, barricades and rifles in black and white from the archive of the Lebanese war, alongside

pictures of what is happening in Yemen, alongside the media and political bickering: wars in several languages.

- War is term-based, brought back with the terminology and the publicity vocabulary: “What can dialogue do after barricades were re-erected between the Future Trend and Hezbollah, till a point that former PM Saad Hariri described the latest interview of Hezbollah's secretary general to Alikhbaria Syria TV as ‘notorious’ and ‘poisoned trumpets’?” (Lebanon Files, April 10, 2015) “The future seems fermented with the constituents of a sectarian, doctrinal, and racist war around the corner.” (Lebanon Files, April 15, 2015)
- Picture-based, security-based: “Security Plan in Dahieh: Finally...” (Lebanon Files, April 1, 2015) The picture of military personnel searching the car of a passerby; a security scene that was not absent from the Lebanese media scene for a long time.
- Picture-based, media-based (soliciting the tool): The pictures of Nasrallah and Hariri, each behind a microphone, with the title: “Between Lausanne and Ain al-Tinah...”, in reference to the bickering with the tool. (Lebanon Files, April 10, 2015)
- Ready: “A civil war project, ready with complete elements. It only needs the push of a button so we enjoy the great explosion!” (Lebanon Files, April 15, 2015) 13 April: Lebanon Rushes Towards War and the West Prevents the Disaster. (Elnashra, April 13, 2015) “The Sectarian Conflict Serves Terrorism.” (Elnashra, April 15, 2015) “Existing Sectarian Tension.” (Elnashra, April 15, 2015)

But there is a decision to push away the specter of sectarian fighting: “In this context, a high-level security authority says: ‘The backbone of the dialogue between the Future Trend and Hezbollah is security-based before anything else. Today, the two parties disagree on almost everything, but the strategic decision to establish security harmonies that push the specter of sectarian fighting away is what kept this dialogue going. Even the dialogue between the Lebanese Forces and the Future Trend is security-based by excellence.’” (Lebanon Files, April 29, 2015)

- Futile war: Walid Jumblatt was “one of the parties swept by fanaticism and hatred.” (Lebanon Files, April 15, 2015)

5 - Accusations and Incitement

“I hold the mullah's regime in Iran responsible for injecting the minds of some Shiites with the interpretations of many religious stories, but we should stop to think how this Iranian regime has invented for itself an integrated system of governance and political power and called it Wali al-Faqih, in order to extend the governor's absolute and unrestricted control and Khomeini and Khamenei reinforced this approach through a legitimacy that is seemingly democratic-religious but in fact authoritarian. And we see now how the Iranian regime is injecting religious interpretations in the Yemeni war to serve armed movements and rebellions against legitimacy.” (Mr. Mohammed Ali Al Hussein, Secretary General of the Arab Muslim Council) (Almustaqbal, April 3, 2015).

“... In case Hezbollah's interest today was to maintain stability in Lebanon, where is the interest in exposing

this stability through an unprecedented campaign against the Saudi leadership, one that does not respect the etiquette of political and diplomatic communication, thus fuelling sectarian feelings and raising the level of tension to the maximum? Why is Hezbollah trying to be more Catholic than the Pope?" (MP Walid Jumblatt, Al Joumhouria, April 3, 2015)

"... Meanwhile, Nasrallah has expressed Iran's interests, in line with his sectarian and dogmatic position, being a part of the Iranian system and the Iranian Revolutionary Guards." (Almostaqbal, April 3, 2015)

"In Hezbollah's opinion, Salam has made a huge mistake by backing the Arab consensus, supporting Yemen's sovereignty, territorial integrity, and social fabric, and calling for neutralizing Lebanon's position on the conflict! The 'Sayyed of the Resistance' had, of course, a different opinion. His speech indicated the extent of his Arab affiliation, when he fiercely defended the Iranian position that 'supports the freedom of peoples' and described the Arabs who are hosting tens of thousands of Lebanese in their countries as 'sluggish, lazy, and losers.' In this sense, only Nasrallah may talk about Lebanon, after his tireless efforts to include 'The Land of Cedars' in the Iranian system, along with Damascus, Baghdad and Sana'a!" (Almostaqbal, April 3, 2015)

On the other side: "The Loyalty to the Resistance Bloc found that (Hizbollah's Secretary General Sayyed Hassan) Nasrallah's position is one of Jihad, a fair statement in the face of an unjust ruler, and an honest and courageous expression, one that is keen on the interest of all Arabs and Muslims, in the face of the deceit of aggressors and their enticing and divisive projects aiming at subduing the Ummah and drawing its attention away from the support of the central

cause: Palestine." (Loyalty to the Resistance: Support for a Political Solution in Yemen, Al Balad, April 3, 2015)

"The sectarian and doctrinal mobilization exerted by the Saudi propaganda machine – The Saudi regime is underdeveloped and exports terrorism and killings." (Nasrallah, on the occasion of the rally of solidarity with Yemen, Al-Akhbar, April 16, 2015)

In order for the statement giver to succeed in delivering what he intends to, he should:

- Know what is his relation with others, i.e. where he stands with others (until the dominant/dominated relation);
- Draw an image for the speaker, i.e. an image of himself so others are convinced with his speech or identify with him;
- Work on organizing what he says.

Based on how they look to themselves and to others, everyone tried to clarify and consolidate their stances, notably with regards to taking standards related to "acceptance" and "credibility" into consideration. Before discussing primary objections, the way the opponent was presented or represented took the lion's share.

There are variants for the terms strong and weak, such as the "aggressor" and the "aggrieved" or the "executioner" and the "victim"... These expressions give rise to sharp dialectic conflicts. Global or Western standards often consider the cause of the weak "fair" and "legitimate" and the cause of the strong is accompanied with terms such as "consider one guilty" and "hold one responsible." The first cause can seem "holy" and the second one "brutal."

This is on the one hand and on the other hand, the auto-victimization is an auto-celebration at the same

time, and the more frightening we show the opponent to be, the more we embellish our image.

Whenever there is a "successful" statement (which is not necessarily right), another contrary statement (which is not necessarily right) is given, and it should be successful to establish balance. Verbal bickering is like field sniping; it has an objective, should aim properly, and should score. The objective is what we call the third party, i.e. the party for which the verbal conflict is ongoing: the recipient in order to convince him.

Incitement serves the aim through statements charged with emotions and that stir up religious sentiments. All the events in the region and in Lebanon nowadays are ongoing on a very complex ground: a scary religious extremism, charged statements, counter speeches, and a will to restrain at the same time. Parties are going in opposite directions and for it to become possible to move from a religious to a political discourse, a possible common argument is needed from both sides of the conflict. The need to negotiate is dictated by a reality that became inevitable and an existence for the other party. The existence of both sides is an acquired reality, meaning that the events, developments, and trends adopted in statements create the image of the other's existence. Religious, political, and rhetorical overlap is also complex, but it exists.

Building religious hegemony in the discourse is not separate from the representation of oneself and the opponent and the representations of values and symbols defended in a cultural industry based on the culture of fear and the authority of ancestral, among others, especially since the media considers itself and this discourse as a producer of meaning.

Upon examining the relation among people and between the person and the world, meaning is not

only sought through signs and relations, but also through its production process. Umberto Eco² wrote that semiotics study all what can be used for lying. This means that when lying is impossible, there is no meaning. In order for it to be meaning and semiotics to study it, there should be a place for lying, i.e. for interpretation.

Let us examine the same scene and how it was called: Starting with "Storm of Deception" (Ad-Diyar) to "Storm of Decisiveness," "Aggression," "Saudi-American Aggression," and "How Did Al Saud Prepare for the Aggression?" (Al-Akhbar, front page, 17 April 2015), up to "the breezes of Hope Storm started to blast across Yemen with the launch of the operation aimed at healing the wounds of Yemeni citizens," (news bulletin of the Future TV, April 23, 2015) and "2,450 or more raids of hatred, around 3,700 martyred and injured Yemenis and hundreds of buildings and facilities destroyed, including schools, mosques and hospitals" (Al-Manar on the same day)...

This is the same event and reality is virtual par excellence. This is the game of media and politics.

On the same day (April 22, 2015), Almostaqbal published under the title: "The Houthi Danger Ends... Yemen Regains 'Hope'." Ad-Diyar used the title: "Saudi Arabia Failed in Yemen and Stopped its Savage Raids. A Radical Change in the Arab Gulf and Post-Storm Yemen Will Not Be Like Before." Meanwhile, Al-Akhbar opted for the title: "First Defeat for Al Saud. The Saudi Storm Dissipates... And the End Is Not Yet Announced!"

Who won? Who lost? Incitement did. All the religious incitement goes back to link the discourse to the political incitement within a strategic

² Eco Umberto, *Traité de sémiotique générale*, 1975.

system linked to power, regardless whether arguments are valid or not.

Hezbollah's "need" to overcome the problem of its weapons domestically in Lebanon urges it to enlarge and amplify its role from the local to the regional space, portraying itself as a decision-maker in shaping the future of Syria and the region, in an attempt to cover up its weapons with its regional role, as well as barter itself with major countries to retain these weapons. It is lenient on some topics and tough in others, conceding on some areas and uncompromising on others, all for one purpose: retaining its military arsenal." (MP Walid Jumblatt, Al Joumhouria, April 3, 2015)

This would be the beginning of the turning point towards the political discourse.

The cross between the holy and authoritarian discourse raises the problem of whether the holy discourse is able to achieve popularity without power, or does it hold a supernatural power within it? Is it possible to imagine the holy discourse without power?

The strength of the religious discourse lies in that it is about human and existence and is almost holy in its signs. The holy discourse "is the equivalent of capability and more so, the equivalent of the fait accompli. The holy discourse is saturated with existence, and the holy capacity also indicates the meaning of reality, permanence and effectiveness. The conflict between the "holy" and the "ordinary" often translates into a conflict between the "realistic" and the "unrealistic" or semi-realistic... It is natural, therefore, that pious people have a deep desire to be, or to contribute in fact to being full of capacity."³

However, the religious discourse in the region in the light of current events is linked to politics, and therefore to the authority. In both discourses, the speaker and media outlets try to manoeuvre the methods to control the discourse, its outputs or inputs: Who has the right to speak? Where? When? And how? Etc... all in order to tighten control on public discourse.

Therefore, negative sentiments are mobilized every time the other disrespects our "sanctities" so he becomes an enemy: This stirs feelings of offense, of jealousy for sanctities, and of anger. Sanctities vary from one party to another. Sometimes, the condemnation of the disrespect of sanctities is violent. Leniency when recounting events also comes as the carrot and the stick approach.

Stories on conflicts are many and everyone has publicly agreed that each side respects the other side, because this ensures that its beliefs are also respected. However, religious incitement is present, and when the country is sectarian, the region's regimes religious and the conflict ongoing, the discourse can easily slide towards incitement.

Oswald Ducrot says that words are not used to represent reality or ideas. They are meaningless, except in the conclusions they lead to. The survey can be summarized in one article, for the examples of the mobilization of emotions are the same and only the positioning is different.

Although the religious discourse is also the same – a tolerant and loving discourse, the fiercest and most terrible wars are religious. The particularity of religious incitement is that there are no discussions or interpretations when faced with the absolute. This discourse also depends on the speed of evoking

sentiments, nervousness and belonging and it exploits foreign events in the local division, so the precedence of religious tendency takes priority over nationalism. And the religious discourse is employed to devote political separation and rejection of others. This is how, in general, the discourse drew the image of others. It is the same image but on different sides.

6 - Specimen of the accusatory tone used in the titles of the monitored media outlets

A- THE ACCUSATORY TONE IN THE TITLES OF TV CHANNELS

- The Saudi Aggression
- Yemenis Under the Missiles of Aggression
- The Political Solution to End the Aggression
- Aggression on Yemen Will Fail
- Massacres of the Saudi Aggression in Sana'a
- Saudi Raids Target Civilian Sites Rather Than Military
- Emphasis on Saudi Arabia's Strategic Error
- Aggression on Yemen Fails and Demonstrations Fill Sana'a
- Hariri Attacks Nasrallah Violently
- Hezbollah Denominates the Aggression of Al Saud
- This is Al Saud's Past and Present
- Stances Reprehensible of Nasrallah's Saying that Al-Asad is one of God's Grants to us
- Khamenei Accused of Launching an Attack on Saudi Arabia
- Media Outlets Race to Attack Saudi Arabia
- Incapable cry because of the decisiveness pain
- Nasrallah Defends Coup Seekers in Yemen
- Raids on Houthi Insurgents
- Nasrallah: No Menace Will Stop us from Condemning the Saudi Aggression on Yemen

B- THE ACCUSATORY TONE IN THE TITLES OF RADIO STATIONS

- I Fear More Than Everything that this Discourse Impacts the Interests of Lebanese Individuals
- The Kingdom is well aware that Lebanon will not sell its Arab identity to its abusers – Condemns the using of state platforms to disrespect the Kingdom
- A new wave of the hatred storm against Saudi Arabia and the Arab solidarity
- Hariri describes Hezbollah's TV interview as infamous
- Netanyahu compares Iran to Nazism and accuses it of trying to control the Middle East
- Hariri's response to Nasrallah: Responsibility lies in not covering up errors and facing the voices of those who slander Saudi Arabia
- Sadr threatens American interests in Iraq and abroad
- Hariri: Our sincere commitment to dialogue does not oblige us to be silent about the campaigns targeting Saudi Arabia
- The Arab coalition pounds rebel positions in Aden
- Geagea's response to Nasrallah: Who helped Lebanon like Saudi Arabia? Where is our interest in attacking it?
- Local stalemate marred by the repercussions of Hezbollah's campaign on Saudi Arabia
- Hariri: History remembers and will remember what the Kingdom of decisiveness offered in Lebanon and poisoned trumpets will not change the truth
- Zahra: The dream of establishing an empire fell with a single decision by Saudi Arabia
- The domestic debate within the controls and Hezbollah's insistence on regional involvement exacerbates the tension
- Geagea: Iran is seeking to improve its position through the confiscation of the presidency and the Arab response will include Syria

³ Eliad M., 2009, pages 53-52.

- Hajar: Iran does not want a presidency at this time
- Iran considers Saudi Arabia and Israel equal
- Ali Hamadeh: The rocket attack on the Future TV came upon order of the Syrian intelligence
- New massacres by the Saudi aggression in Yemen
- The Saudi aggression destroys the infrastructure
- Hariri attacks Iran and defends Saudi Arabia
- Zarif to Oman and Islamabad to discuss the cessation of the aggression on Yemen
- Sayyed Nasrallah: The aggression on Yemen has failed and Saudi Arabia will be defeated
- Sheikh Qassem: What Saudi Arabia is doing in Yemen is genocide
- The crimes of the Saudi aggression expand
- The Influence Storm hits Saudi Arabia
- Aggression aircraft continue their bombardment for destruction purposes and ammunition dropped for Al-Qaeda militants
- The Saudi aggression remains horrible and the army advances
- Yemeni parties: The aggression aims at obstructing dialogue
- The 14 March coalition lashes against Hezbollah for its attacks against Saudi Arabia
- Saudi Arabia will not give up on Lebanon regardless of frenetic voices
- The Saudi embassy terrorizes media outlets
- Nasrallah's media war confuses Saudi Arabia – Hariri accused of playing with fire
- Durian discusses the situation with the Dutch ambassador – Hezbollah accused of hindering the presidency
- Hezbollah responds firmly to the Future Trend and Saudi Arabia
- Hezbollah continues its attack against Arabs and the Future Trend
- The Decisiveness Storm puts an end to Iran's arrogance
- The Future Trend's campaign against Iran is fabrications
- Hezbollah will not remain silent in response to the Future Trend
- The intervention of Hezbollah threatens unity and partnership
- Saudi Arabia made a strategic mistake - What happened in Yemen is a crime
- Stand by vulnerable people – Hezbollah responds to the Future Trend in defense of Iran
- Hezbollah's involvement undermines participation
- Did Hezbollah decide to bring down the government and the dialogue?
- The Iranian illusion agenda weaker than a house of cards
- Qassem: Saudi Arabia is committing genocide
- Where is responsibility when talking about the livelihood of thousands of Lebanese in the Gulf?
- Verbal escalation of Hezbollah's militias continues
- Insults against Saudi Arabia are an incapable cry because of the decisiveness pain
- Fatfat held Nasrallah responsibility for any security flaw

C- THE ACCUSATORY TONE IN THE TITLES OF NEWSPAPERS

- The Iranian intelligence holds Syria hostage
- Hezbollah's error in Lebanon will not be repeated in Yemen
- Nasrallah: Death to Arabs and not to Israel
- Nasrallah threatens the Lebanese in the Gulf
- Nasrallah is the partner of Houthis
- We refuse that our platforms be shared by the thug Al-Asad – Partnering with Al-Asad platforms to attack Saudi Arabia
- Hariri hits out at Nasrallah for Saudi Arabia remarks
- Hariri randomly hits at Nasrallah and Iran

- Nasrallah accused of purposely forgetting the massacres of the regime - the blood regime – Opposition
- We will not accept that the Arab Gulf be Persian
- Nasrallah accused of venturing into the subsistence of the Lebanese people - The interests of the Shiite community
- Dreams of Al Saud – Winning following surrender
- Transition from the Decisiveness Storm to Operation Restore Hope - Saudi Arabia failed
- No one can be subject Yemen
- Nasrallah accused of threatening the interests of the Lebanese abroad
- Nasrallah accused of accumulating his mistakes through defective discourse
- Nasrallah accused of giving contradictory statements
- Iran and Al-Assad have to respect Lebanon's sovereignty
- Nasrallah: Pride in Lebanon and subservience in Yemen
- Iran accused of playing a dangerous and non-constructive role
- Hezbollah accused of involving itself in Iranian storms
- Iran and Syria demanded to leave Lebanon alone
- Iranian intervention rejected
- Al-Asad regime invoked the Islamic State to destroy Yarmuk
- Poisoned trumpets will not change the Saudi role in protecting the Arab identity
- Lebanese storm to face hateful people against the Decisiveness Storm
- Nasrallah integrated in the Persian Empire
- Iran holds the presidency prisoner
- Nasrallah's interview aggravates and Hariri describes as an insult festival
- Hezbollah does not represent the point of view of the Lebanese people
- The Decisiveness Kingdom will not abandon us and Lebanon will not sell its Arab identity to its abusers
- The positions of Nasrallah aggravates and Hariri reacts violently in Lebanon
- Fatfat: Nasrallah integrated in the Iranian Empire
- Hysterical bombing rains over residential neighborhoods
- Washington and Riyadh together with Al-Qaida and Yemen
- American leadership for the Decisiveness Storm
- Resentment of Nasrallah's positions provocative to Saudi Arabia
- Thousands of Revolutionary Guards in Suwayda
- Riyadh accuses Hezbollah of training the Houthis
- Asiri to Berri: What Nasrallah said is completely hostile for us
- Iran is called upon to stop the export of sectarian strife
- Thousands of Revolutionary Guards in Suwayda
- We reject Nasrallah's attack on Saudi Arabia
- Al Saud's Aggression - Ansarullah liberate Aden
- Saudi aggression aimed at injustice
- Saudi Arabia represses Lebanon
- Thousands of Revolutionary Guards in Suwayda
- Jumblatt says Iran closing in on Syrian Druze areas
- Adwan: Which state is Hezbollah aspiring to?
- No common vision for the presidency in the dialogue and Hezbollah breaches the articles of the law on neutrality in wars
- Solidarity in Yemen will defeat the invaders
- Will Iran respond politically in Lebanon by bringing the government down after it brought presidential elections down?
- How does Nasrallah intervene in Syria and ten countries are not entitled to intervene in Yemen?
- Pro-Iranian militias loot Tikrit
- Hezbollah belittles the interests of the Lebanese

people in the Gulf

- Ansarullah hoists the flag in Aden with a hit to the aggression
- Abbas sells Yarmouk to Qatar
- Selling of the Arab identity to become soldiers in Wilayat al-Faqih
- Nasrallah responsible for any security flaw
- Stop using Lebanon as a ground to demonstrate in support of foreign countries
- Flow of criticism against Hezbollah in political circles
- Saudi Arabia failed in Yemen
- Nasrallah destroys the prestige of Saudi Arabia
- Hezbollah's policy destructive and linked to Iran's interests
- The attack on Saudi Arabia: Dimensions, background and objectives
- Nasrallah's policy is destructive
- The Future Movement denounces Nasrallah's attacks against Riyadh
- The Decisiveness Storm Hails the Muslim Brotherhood
- Nasrallah's statements on Saudi Arabia destructive
- The Future Trends: Major errors added to many errors
- Deception Storm: Thousands of civilians killed
- Addressing the Saudi gamble is ongoing
- The end of the Decisiveness Storm is an admission of defeat
- Hezbollah causes conflicts
- The eye of the enemy is on Aden – The Saudi aggression did not stop

7 - Concerning the Disharmony of the Place and Space

Regardless of the parties to the conflict, since we are not researching politics but rather the way it is portrayed in the media, the representation of the other in general were as follows, and the tables in the previous paragraph helped summarizing them:

- It commits "significant errors added to its many errors", It causes "conflicts", and the errors apply to both the parties to the conflict: ("Hezbollah's error in Lebanon will not be repeated in Yemen," "Saudi Arabia committed a strategic mistake - What happened in Yemen is a crime," "Emphasis on Saudi Arabia's strategic error").
- It shows arrogance and snobbery: ("The Storm of Decisiveness puts an end to the Iranian arrogance").
- A coward in its war: ("The targets of Saudi raids are civilian and not military") and a monster that "hysterically bombards residential neighbourhoods heavily."
- Its statements are more a "party of insults" ("Insults against Saudi Arabia are an incapable screaming caused by the pain of decisiveness"). They are "dishonourable" ("Accusing Nasrallah of accumulating mistakes is dishonourable"), free of constants ("contradictory speech"), "destructive", "escalatory" ("Hezbollah escalates the situation internally and regionally"), provocative ("Saudi Arabia will not abandon Lebanon regardless of rabid voices"; "Verbal escalation continues by the Hezbollah militia", "Insults against Saudi Arabia are an incapable screaming caused by the pain of decisiveness", "We refuse that our platforms be shared by the thug Al-Asad – Sorry for the campaigns on Saudi Arabia"; "Hariri accused of playing with fire").
- It refers to the tools used by media outlets

("Nasrallah's media war confuses Saudi Arabia") and that intimidate it ("The Saudi Embassy Terrorizing Media Outlets"). Media outlets announce the response to the verbal bickering that uses media as a substrate key base ("Hezbollah will not remain silent in response to the Future").

- Its policy is "destructive" and this might extend to security ("Fatfat held Nasrallah responsibility for any security flaw").
- Irresponsible ("Disregards the interests of the Lebanese abroad" [i.e. in the Gulf where the crisis has impact, "Threatens the Lebanese in the Gulf", "Nasrallah accused of venturing into the subsistence of the Lebanese people - The interests of the Shiite community", "Where is responsibility when talking about the livelihood of thousands of Lebanese in the Gulf?").
- It is affiliated with foreign countries ("Nasrallah integrated in the Persian Empire"), accused of training (one of the parties to the conflict) abroad ("Nasrallah is the partner of the Houthis", "Riyadh accuses Hezbollah of training the Houthis"...).
- It hinders political and democratic work because of foreign interventions ("Hezbollah accused of hindering the presidency", "Iran holds the presidency prisoner", "Iran and Al-Assad have to respect Lebanon's sovereignty", "Iran and Syria demanded to leave Lebanon alone", "Iranian intervention rejected", "Iran accused of playing a dangerous and non-constructive role").
- It is detrimental to the internal composition ("Hezbollah's involvement undermines participation").
- It is "involved" and takes unilateral decisions ("Hezbollah does not represent the point of view of the Lebanese people").

This is in general the way the discourse drew the other's image and this is the same image each side draws of the other.

Conclusions

This reading of the Lebanese media discourse cannot be isolated from the Lebanese situation in crisis on the political, security, social and economic levels. It can neither be isolated from the daily political reality linking it to events in the real-time, giving it its dimension and various interpretations and dictating certain stances and analyzes to the media.

The Lebanese difficult situation makes us wonder about the reasons, the responsibility and the solution. The media is undoubtedly an effective contributor to the humanitarian movement at various levels, and therefore, its role in promoting the values of citizenship to accept diversity and the different other is emphasized. This is the difficult culture that could invalidate the faster and worst solution: war and violence.

This reading of the reality of the media sought to indicate whether there is a provocative discourse based on a religious background to learn how the media deal with the religious subject in a sectarian country where the majority of outlets are divided according to politics and communities: What are the media trends on the commitment to respect all religions? And what is its stance on facing the stirring up of sectarian strife? Does it play a role in religious incitement?

What are the main conclusions to be drawn out through studying the media outlets targeted in this reading?

1. On Monitoring the Content

- The study did not register any direct religious incitement. However, the results showed an accusatory media discourse with political and sectarian dimensions.
- It seems clear that the religious discourse is strongly present in Lebanon. The religious issue is very important due to its direct association with the general Lebanese situation and hot regional files, notably the Iranian-Gulf conflict with its different political and religious dimensions. It is also clear that when this conflict intensifies, the level of hatred increases and reflects in an intense provocative media discourse to varying degrees.
- Religious terms are abundantly present in the daily media discourse, regardless of the Yemeni extraordinary event.
- Media outlets do not approach events from the same point of view in their headlines and narratives, so the interpretation is different or rather contradictory. This is confirmed by the examples cited in the study, for the labels of events were charged, and when they are charged, they turn into a judgment.
- Upon any negative or positive indicator, media outlets attempt, by channelling the religious discourse, to highlight Lebanon as a symbol of tolerance and coexistence on the one hand, and to talk about the religious mix in Lebanon and the political dialogue between communities and sects under the title of "necessity": the dialogue of necessity and dialogue for security.
- It is also interesting to resort to the discourse of suffering and fear for oneself. Here, the logic of fear predominates and controls all communities with the development of events indicating projects

in which each community sees a threat to its existence, influence, presence and representation. Media outlets broadcast the foreign event with projections on the Lebanese reality with regards to the sharp Sunni-Shiite division.

- The media discourse is also an exclusion discourse and it refers to apologetic strategies promoting oneself and degrading the other through its representations.
- The overlap of the religious and political discourse with authority and reality is inseparable from the symbols that carry and produce this discourse, i.e. the speaker and the media outlet, for the conflict symbols speak with the weight of reference, which means with the present and immediate relation most of the times.
- When the discourse is achieved, we face standard constraints through the relationship with the other and the relationship with the topic "related to religion." At a time when we behave like our true selves, we weave the relationship with the other and with the social conception, i.e. with "what people believe is real and they believe events and humanitarian acts through it," which means values as well. It is a relationship of impact and influence, depending on the roles and positions of actors. "The issue here is not related to the credibility of these values but rather to the strength of their reality, which makes it rise above everything. But does the power of truth exist in the essence of truth in particular or in the impact it leaves on the public? In the first case, truth looks as intuitive and independent and in the second case second, the power of the truth means to believe in it and stop at that."
- The political discourse also finds itself forced to engage in a verbal conflict with the other's discourse because it is determined by its opposition or response to the subsequent discourse. Thus,

it realizes the truth it envisages or that suits it, and it is often a "truth" it "believes" in.

2. On Monitoring the Quantity

- The proportion of provocative discourse in the headlines of the media coverage of hot files in the region was close between the different media outlets monitored. They were distributed between 9% on radio stations, 12% in newspapers and 14% on television.
- Given the two major events on which coverage focused during the monitoring phase, the largest percentage came from contents with an accusatory tone targeting Hezbollah, its affiliations and regional stances (through the person of its Secretary General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, Iran or the Houthis). They recorded a ration of 72% in newspapers, 50% on television and 62% in radio stations. On the opposite side, the media coverage with an accusatory tone targeted Saudi Arabia to a large extent, as well as Al Saud, the Future Trend as a political trend and the person of the Prime Minister Saad Hariri to a lesser extent. They recorded 26% in newspapers among the headlines monitored, 50% on television and 38% in radio stations.
- The Lebanese file accounted for held the highest proportion of accusatory headlines in newspapers at the rate of 65.3%, in TV news bulletins at a rate of 50% and in radio headlines at a rate of 59%. The second file was the Yemeni affair at a rate of 27% in newspapers, 40% on television and 31% in radio headlines. Interestingly, the emerging events in Yemen overshadowed the events in Syria and Iraq, which are still remarkable in the media coverage, but to varying degrees.

- Results showed that the impact of events on the media line-up is clear. This was represented in the overall figures and the percentage of materials distribution and concentration through media platforms. For example, 60% of the provocative discourse was concentrated in five out of 11 newspapers monitored, 75% on two TV channels out of seven monitored and two out of eight radio stations monitored. The division was clear in the media as it is in reality.
- The topics that caused an exchange of accusations in the various monitored headlines were distributed as following:
 - 53% of accusatory headlines in monitored newspapers revolved around the topic of war on Yemen and 29% around the speech of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah.
 - 65% of accusatory headlines in monitored TV news bulletins revolved around the topic of war on Yemen and 30% around the speech of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah.
 - 59% of accusatory headlines in monitored radio news bulletins revolved around the topic of war on Yemen and 21% around the speech of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah.

Recommendations

Media outlets can play a role in stepping away from religious incitement through several measures, such as:

- Activate the Charter of Journalists to Promote Civil Peace in Lebanon by moving away from the provocative discourse, broadcasting any discourse that fuels feelings of hatred or using harsh expressions.
- It is necessary to develop a strategy for media outlets to outline how to deal with the provocative religious discourse or extremist ideologies, so they are not drawn towards adopting the proposal quickly, but rather prepare in advance for how to edit the media information, use the terminology, show pictures or not and comment on them... This is how media outlets will be ready, especially that the region and Lebanon need this measure since the religious topic is strongly present and looks like it will remain as such for a long time.
- Rebuild confidence in daily discursive practices in the media by moving away from fuelling sentiments and seek to write in a way closer to calming by sticking to facts that help to approach objectiveness.
- Highlighted the positive side of the topic and not only the negative and frightening side and focus on the fact that the future can be much better.
- Avoid verbal bickering because it hurts just like bickering in the field and move away from violent writing and escalation, notably since the country is sectarian, the majority of regional regimes are religious and the situation is unstable. In this case, discourse can easily slide into incitement. Broadcasting about political and security events from a religious perspective facilitates sliding into incitement and fuelling sentiments and

instincts. On the contrary, media outlets can contribute in absorbing sectarian congestion.

- Benefit from dialogue and move away from discussing sectarian incitement contents and call for dialogue in times of crisis.
- Try to motivate critical thinking in the media by widening the horizons of discussions and giving educated people a space to motivate deepening such discussions. "The whole society changes and gets reproduced by continuously working on itself, understanding its reality and imagining itself. It does so in a way that enables it to dismantle what vision and evaluation patterns build in, or ways of thinking and appreciation or production and exchange systems. This leads to a change in power relations... and this is a task in which the society in all its sectors and figures participate..."⁴

⁴ Harb Ali, *Elite Illusions or Educated Criticism*, Arab Cultural Center, 2004, pages 15-14.

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